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mation of the criminal act as charged, and as
sho77ing the intent of the prisoner, was put
in evidence by the prosecution. * The accused
having been made a witness in her own be-
half, it was declared that her version of the
conversation was competent, being a part of
acts in themselves competent evidence and as
showing the motive causing the same.2 5 Dy-
ing declarations exonerating the prisoner,
when so remote as not to be considered part
of the yes geston, are incompetent. 26
The mere declarations of an assignor, when
no part of the res gestoe, are inadmissible to
prejudice his assignee's title, whether the
same are made prior or subsequent to the as-
signment. 27 Though in case of vendors, the
declarations are admissible to show fraudu-
lent transfer when made prior to parting with
title, and are part of the res gestce ;25 but
declarations are incompetent when made sub-
sequently to the time of sale. 29
Bridgeport, Copn. JosEii A. JOYCE.
26 Mack v. State, 48 Wis. 271.
26 Moeck v. People, 100 II. 212; Merrill v. State, 5S
Miss. 65. As to dying declarations under the rule of res
geste, see State v. Draper, 65 Mo. 335; s. C., 27 Am.
Rep. 287; Binns v. State, 57 Ind. 46; s. C., 26 Am.
Rep. 48; Reg. v. Bedinglield, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 341;
s. C., 28 Eng. Rep. (Moak's notes) 587, and note 594;
Arch. Crim. Prac. & Plead. (Por. notes, 8th ed:)
428-435 and notes. In Williams v. atate, 10 Tex. Ct.
App., Crim. Cas. 528, the response of the deceased
made immediately after the infliction of the death
wound, and while he was dying, in answer to the in-
quiry by witness: "What is the matter with you?''
sayine, ''Jack Williams'shot me," was held a part of
the res geste, being clearly interwoven with the prin-
cipal transaction. Warren v. State, 0 Tex. Ct. App.
619; s. c., 35 Am. Rep. 745; Field v. State, 57 Miss.
474; S. C., 34 Am. Rep. 476, note 479; Wharton on
Homicide, sec. 767.
217 Truax v. Slater, 86 IN. Y. 680; Coyne v. Weaver,
84 N. Y. 386; Peck v. Crouse, 46 Barb. 151; Kimball
v. :Huntington, 10 Wend. 675; S. C., 25 Am. Dec. 590;
Newlin v. Lyon, 49 N. Y. 661. But see Miller v.
Bingham, 29 Vt. 82.
28 Fisher v. True, 38 Me. 534.
29 Kennedy v. Divine, 77 Ind. 490; Burnham v.
Brennan, 74 N. Y. 597; Blakeslee v. Rossman, 44 Wis.
553; Ohio Coal Co. v. Davenport, 37 Ohio St. 194;
Dodge v. Stanhope, 55 Md. 113; McCormicks v. Ful-
lcr, 56 Iowa, 43.
THE COMPENSATION OF EXPERTS.
The law relating to the compensation of
experts is somewhat unsettled, and the dases
are not numerous in which the subject has
been considered. This very fact, however,
lends additional interest to the subject, and
the question is one of great importance. In
some of the States the law expressly pro-
vides that when a witness is summoned to tes-
tify as an expert he shall be entitled to extra
compensation. Such a provision may be
found in the laws of Iowa, of North Carolina,
and of Rhode Island. They are as follows:
Iowa.-Witnesses called to testify only to
an opinion founded on special study or ex-
perience in any branch of science, or to make
scientific or professional examinations gi'nd
state the result thereof, shall receive addi-
tional compensation, to be fixed by the court,
with reference to the value of the time em-
ployed, and the degree of learning or skill
required." 1
North Carolina. -"Experts when compel-
led to attend and testify, shall be allowed
such compensation and mileage as the court
may in it discretion order." 2
Rhode Island.-"ln addition to the fees
above provided, witnesses summoned and tes-
tifying as experts in behalf of the State be-
fore any justice of the Supreme Court, trial
justice, or coroner, may be allowed and paid
such sum as such justice of the Supreme
Court, trial justice, or coroner, may deem
just and reasonable: Provided, that the al-
lowance so made by any trial justice or cor-
oner, shall be subject to tie approval of a
justice of the S'ipreme Court." 3
But, on the other hand, the State of Indi-
ana has enacted the following provision: "A
witness who is an expert in any art, science,
trade, profession or mystery, may be compel-
led to appear and testify to an opinion as
such expert, in relation to any matter, when-
ever such opinion is material evidence, rele-
vant to an issue on trial before a court or
jury, without payment or tender of compen-
sation other than the per diem and mileage
allowed by law to witnesses, under the same
' Code of 1873, see. 3814. See Snyder v. Iowa City,
40 Iowa, 646.
2 Laws of 1871, ch. 139, sec. 13. See State v. Dollar,
76 IN. C. 626.
3 Pub. Statutes (1882) p. 738, see. 15.
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rules and regulations by which he can be
compelled to appear and testify to his knowl-
edge of facts relevant to the same issue." 4
In the absence of all statutory provision
authorizing it, the compensation of experts,
beyond the regular witness fees, is not a
necessary disbursement, and can not be taxed
as a part of the costs. It is considered as
having been incurred for the party's own ben-
efit, and is no more a disbursement in the
cause than the fees paid to an attorney. 5
The Effect of Making Extra Compensation.
-It is undoubtedly the practice in all import-
ant cases, for the parties callirg experts, or
professional witnesses, to pay them an addi-
tional compensation. And it is not considered
contrary to the policy of the law that these
witnesses should be specially feed. For if
special compensation was not made or per-
mitted, the testimony of such witnesses could
not be procured without great pecuniary loss,
and perhaps could not be secured at all.
While the question as to the amount paid, or
agreed to be paid, in such cases, can not af-
feet in the least the regularity of the trial,
yet it is stated that it may, perhaps, properly
affect the credit of the witness with the jury.
6
Experts Need not Make a Preliminary Ex-
amination of Facts UnlessSpecial Compensa-
tion is Made.-An expert can not be'compel-
led to make any preliminary investigation of
the facts involved in a case, in order to enable
him to attend on the trial and give a profes-
sional opinion. For instance, if the State
desires the opinion of medical experts as to
the cause of death, it can not compel them
to make a post-mortem examination of the
bod1y of the deceased, for 'the purpose of
qualifying him to express an opinion as to
what was the cause of death. 7 And it has
been said that an expert can not be required
to attend during the entire trial, for the pur-
pose of attentively considering, and carefully
listening to the testimony, in order that he
may be qualified to express a deliberate opin-
ion upon such testimony.8 In all such cases
special compensation should be made.
0 4 Indiana Revised Statutes 1881, p. 94, sec. 504.
6 Mack v. City of Buffalo, N. Y. Ct. App., Dec.,
1881, 1$ Reporter, 251. And see Haynes v. Mosher,
15 How. Pr. 216.
6 See People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
207, 240.
7 See Summers v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. App. 374.
8 See People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
220.
Whether Special Compensation Must be
Made to Experts Testifying as Such.- There
can be no doubt that professional men are
not entitled, in tlis country, to claim any ad-
ditional compensation when testifying as or-
dinary witnesses to facts which happened to
fall under their observation. 9 But another
question arises, when they are summoned to
testify as to facts of science with which they
have become familiar by means of special
study and investigation, and to express opin-
ions based upon the skill acquired from such
research, as to conclusions which ought to be
drawn from ceriain given facts. Whether
they can be compelled to testify in such cases
when i.o other compensation has been ten-
dered than the usual fees of witnesses testi-
fying to ordinary facts, is a point upon which
the cases are not in harmony. In this coun-
try the cases are so nearly balanced, that the
question must be regarded as still an open
one. But in England it seems to be settled
that additional compensation is required.
'The practical importance of the question re-
quires that the subject be examined some-
what at length.
Opinions of Writers on Medical Jurispru-
dence as to Additional Compensation. -And
before examining the decisions of the courts,
attention is called to the opinions of the writ-
ers on Medical Jurisprudence. For while
these opinions can not be regarded as author-
itative, they are important, and entitled to
the respectful consideration of the profession
and the courts. In Ordonaux's Jurispru-
dence of Medicine,' 0 that learned and dis-
tinguished writer says: "It is evident that
the skill and professional experience of a man
are so far his individual capital and property
that he can not be compelled to bestow it
gratuitously upon any party. Neither the
public any more than a private person have a
right to extort services from him, in the line
of his profession, without adequate compen-
sation. On the witness-stand, precisely as in
his office, his opinion may be given or with-
held at pleasure; for a skilled witness can not,
be, compelled to give an opinion, nor commit-
ted for contempt if he refuse to do so. Who-
ever calls for an opinion from him in chief, is
under obligation to remunerate him, since he
9 Snyder v. Iowa City, 40 Iowa, 646. And see
Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1.
10 Sees. 114, 115.
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has -to that extent employed him profession-
ally; and the expert, at the outset, may de-
cline giving his opinion until the party calling
him either pays, or agrees to pay him, for it.
When, however, he has given his opinion, he
has now placed it among the res qestce, and
can not decline repeaung it or explaining it
on cross-exaimination. Once uttered to the
public ear of the court, it passes among the
facts in evidence."
So in Beck's Medical Jurisprudence the
eminent author, in considering this subject,
comments as follows: "If the duties on which
I have enlarged are important to the com-
munity, in promoting the proper administra-
tion of justice, ought not the individuals en-
gaged in them to receive adequate compensa-
tion? I advert to this, not only because it is
just in principle, but because it would remove
all imputation of volunteering in criminal
cases. No one can refuse being a witness
when legally summoned; every one, I pre-
sume, may decline the dissection of a dead
body, or the chemical examination of a sis-
pected fluid; and yet there is not, I believe,
an individual attending on any of our courts,
who is not paid for his time and services,
with the exception of such as are engaged in
these investigations. * • * * * It is quite
tive that the medical profession in this coun-
'try should rouse itself to a demand of its
just rights " 11
American Cases Favoring Extra Compen-
sation.-The earliest of the American cases
upon this subject seems to have arisen in the
"District Court of the United States for the
District of Massachusetts, in 1854. The
question came up before Sprague, J., in the
following manner. During a trial upon an
indictment, a motion for a capias was made
by the district attorney, for the purpose of
bringint.in a witness subpoenaed to act as an
interpreter of some German witnesses, but
who had refused or neglected to attend. In
answer to this application, the court said: "A
similar question has heretofore arisen, and I
have declined to issue process to assist in such
cases. When a perso4 has knowledge of any
fact pertinent to the issues to be tried, he
may be compelled to attend as a witness. In
this all stand upon an equal ground. But to
compel a person to attend merely because he
11 2 Beck's Medical Jurisprudence, 20, 921.
is accomplished in a particular science, art or
profession, would subject the same individual
to be called upon in every cause in which any
question in his department of knowledge is
to be solve,. Thus, the most eminent physi-
cian might be compelled, merely for the or-
dinary witness fees, to attend from the re-
motest part of the district to give his opinion
in every trial in which a medical question
should arise. This is so unreasonable that
nothing but necessity can justify it. The
case of an interpreter is analogous to that of
an expert. It is not necessary to say what the
court would do if it appeared that no other
interpreter could be obtained by a reasonable
effort. Such a case is not made as the found-
ation of this motion. It is well known that
there are in Boston many native Germans and
others skilled in both the German and English
languages, some of whom, it may be pie-
sumed, might without difficulty be induced to
attend for an adequate compensation.
'12
The question came before the Supreme
Court of Indiaaa in 1877 in Buchman v.
State,' 3 the statute above noted not having
been enacted, and that court held that while
a physician or surgeon could be required to
attend as a witness to facts without other
compensation than that provided by law for
other witnesses, yet he could not be required
to testify as to his professional opinion with-
out the compensation of a professional fee.
In the opinion of the court, the professional
knowledge of an attorney or physician is to
be regarded in the light of property, and his
professional services are no more at the mercy
of the public, as 'to remuneration, then are
the goods of the merchant, or the crops of
the farmer, or the wares of the mechanic.
"CWhen a physician testifies as an expert, by
giving his opinion, he is performing," says
the court, "a strictly professional service.
To be sure he performs that service under the
sanction of an oath. So does the lawyer
when he performs any service in a cause.
The position of a medical witness, testifying
as a medical expert, is much more like that of
a lawyer than that of an ordinary witness,tes-
tifying to facts. The purpose of his service
is not to prove facts in the cause, but to aid
the court or jury in arriving at a proper con-
12 In the matter of Roelker, 1 Sprague, 276. -
13 59 Ind. 1.
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elusion from facts otherwise proved." The
court then goes on to say that if physicians or
surgeons can be compelled to render profes-
sional services by giving their opinions on
the trial of causes without compensation then
an eminent physician or surgeon may be com-
pelled to go to any part of the State at any
and all times, to render such service, without
other compensation than is afforded by the
ordinary witness fees. And this the court
does not think he can be compelled to do.
This conclusion is based both upon general
piinciples of law and the Constitution of the
State, which provides that "no man's partic-
ular services shall be demanded without just
compensation."
The latest case in which this subject has
been considered seems to be the case of the
United States v. Howe, recently decided in
the United States District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas. 14 In this case,
which was a prosecution for murder, a physi-
cian summoned as an expert, being sworn,
refused to testify unless first paid a reasona-
ble compensation for giving the result of his
skill and experience. The court declined to
regard this refusal as a contempt of court.
The distinction was sustained between a wit-
ness called to depose to a matter of opinion
depending on his skill in a particular profes-
sion or trade, ad a witness called to depose
to facts which ie saw. When he has facts
within his knowledge, the public have a right
to those facts; but che skill and professional
experience of a man are so far his individual
capital and property that he can not be com-
pelled to bestow them gratuitously upon any
party. That the public can not, any more
than a private person, extort services from a
person in the line of his profession or trade
without adequate compensation.
American Cases Denying the Right to Ex-
tra Compensation.-A different conclusion to
that reached in the foregoing cases was arrived
at in the Supreme Court of Alabama in 1875,
in Ex parte.Dement.15 The prisoner on trial
was charged with murder, and the physician,
after testifying that he had seen the deceased
after he had received the wounds which the
prosecution asserted had produced death, was
asked to state the nature and character of the
14 12 Cent. L. J. 193.
15 53 Ala. 389.
wound received and its probable effect. This
he declined to do, upon the ground that "he
had not been remunerated for his profession-
al opinion, nor had compensation for his pro-
fessional opinion been promised or secured."
A fine was thereupon imposed upon him for
contempt of 'court. A motion to have the
fine set aside upon the ground that the court
could not compel him to testify as a profes-
sional expert, until compensation for his pro-
fessional opinion had been first made or
secured, having been overruled, the case was
taken on appeal to the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the ruling. In their decision, after
an examination of the authorities, the court
say: "It will be noticed that it has not beeni
adjudged in any of the eases cited, that a
physician or other person examined as an ex-
pert is entitled to be paid for his testimony
as for professional opinions. The reports
contain nothing to this effect. The English
cases only indicate, and it is implied by the
decision of Judge Sprague (In the matter of
Roelker16), that persons summoned to testify
as experts, ought to receive compensation for
their loss of time. And it is to be inferred
that the judges delivering some of the opin-
ions thought the time of such a witness ought
to be valued, in the language of the English
statute, 'according to his countenance aid
calling.' But it is not intimated by any of
them, that a physician, when testifying, is to
be considered as exercising his skill and
learning in the healing art, which is his high
vocation; or that a counselor at law, in the
same situation, is exerting his talents and ac-
quirements in professionally investigating and
upholding the rights of a client. If this were
so, each one should be paid for his testimony
as a witness, as he is paid by clients, or
patients, according to the importance of the
case and his own established reputation for
ability and skill. But in truth he is not real-
ly employed or retained by any person. And
the evidence he is required to give should not
be given with the intent to take the part of
either contestant in the suit, but with a strict
regard to the truth, in ordei to aid the court
to pronounce a correct judgment."
In 1879, tne question came before the
Court of Appeals in Texas, in Summer v.
State.' 7 In this case the defendant being
16 Sprague's Decisions, 276.
17 5 Texas Court of App. 74.
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-,on trial for murder, the State called a medic-
al practitioner, one Dr. Spohn, who testified
that he had attended the deceased, and had
made a post mortem examination, but declined
;to state the cause of his death. In his testi-
mony he said: "I found the deceased breath-
ing, but unconscious; had a contusion upon
the left side of the head, but no exterior evi-
idence of fractured skull; removed the patient
to town and attended him until the next day,
when he died; after death, made a post mor-
tem examination, but I decline to state the
cause of the man's death, as my knowledge
was obtained by professional skill and from
the deductions of experience, which I con-
sider my own property, and which the county
-of Nueces has persistently refused to pay fdr.
I have no knowledge of the actual cause of
the man's death, save through the post mor-
,ter examination alluded to." The trial court
sustained this. refusal to disclose the knowl-
,edge thus acquired, upon the ground that not
having been paid, he could not be compelled
to testify as to the same. But the Court of
Appeals viewed the matter in a different light,
and expressed itself as follows: "The court
-may compel a physician to testify as to the
result of a post mortem examination; and it is
to be regretted that a member of a profession
-so distinguished for liberal culture and high
-sense of honor and duty should refuse to tes-
-tify in a cause pending before the courts of
his country, involving the life or liberty of a
fellow-being and the rightful administration
-of the laws of a common country. Dr. Spohn
,has doubtless been misled, in taking the po-
sition he did, by the misconceptions of cer-
tain writers on medical jurisprudence."
The court then refers to Ex parte Dement,
.and concludes as follows: "A medical ex-
pert could not be compelled to make a post
-mortem examination unless paid for it; but
an examination having already been made by
him, he could be compelled to disclose the
result of that examination."
Extra Compensation Allowed in England.
-In Betts v. Clifford,1s Lord Campbell de-
,ceared that a scientific witness, or expert, was
hot bound to attend upon being served with
.a subpona,'and that he ought not to be sub-
ponaed. If the witness,, however, knew any
.question of fact, he might be compelled to
is Warwick Lent Assizes, 1838.
attend; but lie could not be compelled to at-
tend to speak merely to matters of opinion.
The same distinction was also taken in Webb
v. Page,19 which was a case in which a witness
had been called by the plaintiff to testify as
to the damage sustained by certain cabinet
work, and the expense necessary to restore
or replace the injured articles. The witness
having demanded compensation, Mr. Justice
Maule said: "There is a distinction between
the case of -a man who sees a fact, and is
called to prove it in a court of law, and a man'
who is selected by a par'y to give his opinion
on a matter on which he is peculiarly oonver-
sant from the nature of his employment in
life. The former is bound, as a matter of
public duty, to speak to a fact which happens
to have fallen within his own knowledge;
without such testimony the course of justice
must be stopped. The latter is under no
such obligation; there is no such necessity
for his evidence, and the party who selects
him must pay him." According to these
cases, therefore, an expert is under no obli-
gation to testify as to matters of opinion, at
least in civil cases. If his testimony is de-
sired, the party desiring it must first render
him such compensation as his services are
worth. It is also to be noticed that, in En-
gland, it has been held, in civil cases at least,
that a professional man, even though called
to testify to facts and not to opinions, is en-
titled to extra compensation on the higher
scale allowed under the statute of Elizabeth,
20
which provides that the witness must "have
tendered to him,. according to his countenance
or calling, his reasonable charges." In a
case decided in 1862, the expenses of an at-
torney, called as a witness, but who did not
give professional evidence, were allowed by
the Master, on the higher scale allowed pro-
fessional witnesses. This allowance was held
proper on motion to show cause, and Mr.
Chief Justice Erle said: "We do not ap-
prove of the rule which is Raid to prevail in
criminal cases, that if a surgeon is called to
give evidence not of a professional character,
he is only to have the expenses of an ordinary
witness. We think the Master was quite right
in allowing the expenses of this witness on
the higher scale." 21 So, also, in Turner v.
19 1 Car. & I. 25.
20 5 Eliz., c. 9.
21 Pavkinson v. AtkinsoD, 31 L. J. (N. S.) C. P. 199.
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Turner, 22 the same principle was applied by
the vice chancellor in the case of a barrister.
The theory seems to be that Ihe time of pro-
fessional men is more valuable than the time
of non-professional men, and that they should
be compensated accordingly. It has been
suggested that the rule is a hard one,
23 and it
may be considered doubtful whether it can
stand the test of examination.
Special Compensation to Experts Employed
by the State in Criminal Cases.-And in the
absence of express statutory provision author-
izing it, it has been the practice in many of
the States, in criminal cases, to make a prop-
er compensation to the experts summoned by
the government. As law)ers who are em-
ployed by the government to assist in the
prosecution of the criminal, receive a special
compensation, so the experts receive a special
compensation; and this is allowed under cer-
tain statutory provisions authorizing the al-
lowance of accounts for necessary services
and expenses.
Special Compensation to Experts Summoned
for the Defense, Paid out o1 the Public Treas-
ury.-The Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
in 1870, had its attention called to the right
to allow the prisoner's counsel, in the case of
an indictment for murder, to tax as a part of
the costs, to be paid out of the public treas-
ury, extra compensation to the experts em-
ployed by him, as a part of the necessary
expenses of the trial, and as such to be al-
lowed under the statutes referred to in the
preceding section. As the question is an im-
portant one, 'we quote fIom the devision, A-
lowing such taxation, as follows:
"Whenever the prosecuting officer thinks
the interests of justice require it, we do not
doubt that he is authorized, by the statutes
above mentioned, to employ experts to make
proper investigations for ascertaining the
truth of a case, and that it is proper for him
in some capital cases to enable the prisoner's
counsel to make similar investigations, and to
procure the attendance of experts at the trial,
if the prisoner is not able to do so; and the
court is ,Uthovizmd to ltlow % reamaoble
compensation to such experts for their ser-
vices, both for attending the trial and for
225 Jur. (N. S.) 889.
23 See Lonergan v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 7
Bing. 725, 727; Collins v. Godefroy, 1 Barn. & Adol.
930.
their prior investigations. This is not on the,
ground that the statute has given to a pris-
oier the right to such aid at the expense of'
the public treasury, but on the ground that it.
is for the interest of the Commonwealth, in.
the case then before the court, that all proper-
investigations should be made, in order to
guard against the danger of doing ijustice-
to the prisoner in A case where he is exposed
to so great a penalty., * * * We do.
not think the prosecuting officer of the court
would be autlhxorized to allow the ehn'rgt of
all such persons as the prisoner would have a.,
right to employ as experts at his own ex-
pense, without regard to their character, or
to the need of employing them in the case..
But the assent of the prosecuting officer
should be obtained beforehand to the employ-
ment of such experts as may be selected and'
agreed upon, or, in case of his refusal to as-
sent, application should be made to the court.
to appoint the experts, This would be the,
more proper course of proceeding, if the pris-
oner desires to have the experts calledbyhhin
paid out of the public treasury." 24
HENRY WADE BRoGFs.
24 Attorney-General, Petitioner, 104 Mass. 637.
MORTGAGE OF SEVERAL PARCELS OF'
REALlESTATE-VALIDITY OF SALE OF'
S ALE OF ONE.
PRYOR v. BAKER.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ( Wor-
cester), October, 1882.
Where distinet parcels of land situate in different
towns are embraced in a single mortgage deed, by the,-
conditions of which the mortgugee is entitled, in de-
fault in the payment of the sums secured thareby,
to "sell the granted premises, or such portions there-
of, as may remain subject to this mortgage," a sale.
for breach of conditions of one pnrcel is valid, al-
though the other parcels were not advertised and sold
at the same time. Whether subsequent sales of the-
remaining parcelswould be valid, quvre.
D. MOunin, Jr., flav Pl~tlittff; V'rri & G~aut
for defendants.
DEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Lovell Baker, was the mort-
gagee by virtue of a'single deed of three distinct
parcels of land situate, respectively, in the towns.
of Rutland, Millbmy and Leicester, in the county
of Worcester. By the conditions of his mort-
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